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Abstract 
In this paper, we confront some commonly held assumptions and objections 
with regard to the feasibility of deliberation in a transnational and pluri-
lingual setting. To illustrate our argument, we rely on a solid set of both 
quantitative and qualitative data from Europolis, a transnational deliberative 
experiment that took place one week ahead of the 2009 European 
Parliamentary elections. The European deliberative poll is an ideal case for 
testing the viability of deliberative democracy across political cultures because 
it introduces variation in terms of constituency and group plurality under the 
controlled conditions of a scientific experiment. On the basis of our 
measurement of both participants’ self-perceptions and changes of opinions 
through questionnaires and of group dynamics and interactions through 
qualitative coding of  group discussions we can identify the following patterns: 
1) The EU polity is generally recognised and taken as a reference point by 
participants for exercising communicative power and impact on decision-
making, 2) the Europolis experiment proves that participants are in fact able to 
interact and debate across languages and cultures, developing a self-
awareness of citizens of a shared polity and thereby turning a heterogeneous 
group of randomly selected group into a constituency of democracy.  
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Introduction 
Ten years ago there was widespread optimism with regard to the possibilities 
of activating European citizens as members of a constituency of European 
democracy. The assumption was that the European Union (EU) was in need of 
more citizens’ participation to overcome its democratic deficit and to turn the 
Europe of elites into a Europe of citizens. In scholarly debates this optimism 
was reflected in the ‘deliberative turn’ of EU studies relying on the integrative 
potential of deliberation and consensus seeking procedures as an alternative 
path to majoritarian democracy (Eriksen and Fossum 2000: 7). Following this 
logic, the emergence of a European public sphere was held possible through 
strong publics as the promoters of democratic reform with the double task of 
enhancing the reflexivity of governance and constituting the citizenry through 
a pan-European discourse about the constitutional essentials of the new 
political entity (Eriksen 2005a; Eriksen 2005b). From this normative 
perspective, deliberation within strong publics was seen as a harbinger for the 
democratisation of EU politics. To the extent that it was put under empirical 
scrutiny, deliberation was studied mainly as an additional means of 
communication in expert discourses, for instance in the comitology system of 
the EU (see Joerges and Neyer 1997a; 1997b). Only few empirical studies dealt 
thus far with the conditions and capacities for citizen deliberation within the 
EU (Abels 2009) even though EU institutions already implemented several 
deliberative experiences in order to involve the citizens in dialogue and 
stimulate a public debate across Europe.   
 
The debate on the democratic deficit of the EU has increasingly involved calls 
for a more profound engagement of ‘ordinary’ citizens in European politics. 
The low level of political participation in EU politics has become all the more 
acute in recent years as the so-called ‘permissive consensus’ has been cast 
aside by growing discontent among citizens with the integration project 
(Hooghe and Marks 2009); most clearly visible recently in a string of popular 
rejections of the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties. Moreover, the new 
diversity of the enlarged Europe is potentially a further obstacle to mutual 
understanding among the peoples of Europe and the activation of European 
citizenship. European Parliamentary elections thus far rather amplified the 
problem addressing the citizens mainly as uninformed voters, displaying 
decreasing turnouts and increasing support for populist parties and 
Eurosceptic opposition. 
 
But what do citizens actually think and how do they behave when informed 
properly about the EU and encouraged to exchange their views and opinions 
about EU politics? So-called Deliberative Polling provides us with a research 
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tool linked to an experimental design to answer precisely this question with 
regard to the potential impact of engaging citizens vis-à-vis EU institutions 
(Fishkin et al. 2000; Fishkin and Luskin 2005). The Europolis Deliberative Poll 
was held in Brussels one week before the 2009 European Parliamentary 
elections inviting a randomly sampled group of lay citizens from all member 
states to deliberate freely on political issues of relevance for the election.1  
 
In this paper, we intend to scrutinise more closely the conditions and 
dynamics of citizens’ deliberation in the pluri-lingual and multicultural setting 
of European politics. In the first section, we lay out the main ideas behind 
deliberative polling and map two challenges to deliberative democratic 
practice and theory in heterogeneous political settings such as the EU. We then 
present the design of the Europolis deliberative poll and methodological 
issues of coding and measurement of deliberation between lay citizens. 
Finally, we analyse actual deliberation in the Europolis deliberative 
experiment focusing on these challenges. 
 
Deliberation under conditions of group heterogeneity and 
language pluralism: two challenges 
Deliberative polling has been launched as an alternative to public opinion 
research to measure the informed opinion of citizens going through a 
monitored process of public deliberations (Fishkin 1991; 1995). As a 
democratic experiment, deliberative polls were designed in a way to maximize 
two principles of democracy, which are usually defined as exclusive: 
participation and deliberation (Fishkin 2009: 95). Can citizens be engaged in a 
broader public dialogue that is at the same time driven by rational 
consideration and arguments? Can a public sphere be created that is inclusive 
and engaged in high quality deliberation? Through careful experimental 
design, deliberative polling projects have succeeded to implement the 
conditions for an inclusive and deliberative public sphere both at the national 
and at the local level. They have also been applied in different political 
cultures: in developed Western democracies, in the new democracies of 
Eastern Europe as well as in an authoritarian regime like China. Deliberative 
polls have further been tested out with regard to a large variety of issues such 
as local policy issues, environmental policies, budgetary issues, constitutional 
design and foreign policy.2 
                                                 
1 Europolis is a project co-funded by the 7th Framework Programme of the European Commission , 
the King Baudouin Foundation,  the Robert Bosch Stiftung, Compagnia di San Paolo, and the Open 
Society Institute. For an overview and summaries of results from questionnaires see 
http://www.europolis-project.eu/ 
2 For more information on the substantive topics and designs of each deliberative poll, see 
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Deliberative polling experiments provide sufficient evidence for the potential 
of deliberation to empower citizens within contextualised national cultures, 
when participants share the same language and are familiar with political 
rules and institutions. Apart from improving the general knowledge and the 
participants’ political engagement, deliberative polls also result in value 
changes and increased agreement on problem perceptions, expressions of 
concern and possible solutions (Fishkin et al. 2000; Luskin et al. 2002: 474ff.). 
Deliberative polls have proven successful in achieving consent on policy 
content, and in fostering citizens’ allegiance to their polity. In this sense, the 
application of the method of deliberative polling has made a substantial 
contribution to illuminate key questions of both mass politics and democratic 
theory (ibid.: 487). Deliberation makes a difference in helping people to 
become aware of balanced information about policy issues; to exchange 
thoughtful views with other participants; and to reflect and modify their 
original views in light of exposure to information and discussion. Deliberative 
polls are thus able to stipulate processes of individual and collective opinion 
formation that are not available to other democratic procedures. Deliberative 
polling is however usually applied within a national, monolingual political 
culture. While there appears to be agreement on the applicability and 
normative value of deliberative polling in local and national settings, applying 
this experiment to a transnational setting poses additional challenges. 
 
In the case of Europolis, the designing of deliberative polling meets two 
additional challenges when confronted with the conventional way of applying 
the method within a contextualised national context. First, the applicability of 
the experiment is put into question by the fact that the group of randomly 
selected participants are situated within a non-finished polity. Political 
authority of the European Union is neither legally consolidated nor socially 
accepted. The polity as the reference point for the sample is not the familiar 
environment of national or regional government but a complex multi-level 
governance arrangement. This introduces further uncertainty with regard to 
the question of which type of administration, legislative procedures and 
formal government deliberation should exert influence on. Is communicative 
power expressed through transnational deliberative bodies renationalised in 
the sense of targeting mainly domestic institutions and decision-making 
processes or do such ‘mini-publics’ rather pay tribute to the complexity of 
multi-level governance in the sense of empowering European institutions and 
supranational authority?  
 
The second challenge of relevance here is that the constituency from which the 
representative sample is chosen for deliberative polling lacks concrete political 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://cdd.stanford.edu/. 
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recognition. Participants of Europolis were not members of a pre-established 
demos or a fully recognised and taken for granted political community. They 
were also not professionals with expert knowledge and multi-lingual skills. 
Participants rather represented lay citizens from 27 member states, spoke 23 
different languages and differed widely in their opinion and attitudes about 
the issues at stake and about the EU in general. The EU represents precisely 
this case, in which the constituency of democratic politics is neither fully 
legally recognised nor is it self-recognising as a politically bounded and 
culturally distinct community. EU constituents are unbounded, multi-
dimensional and contested (Abromeit and Schmidt 1998; Fossum and Trenz 
2006a; 2006b). Statistical indicators for drawing a representative sample of 
European citizens can therefore not rely on the background assumption of a 
relatively homogeneous and monolingual population but must take into 
account the existence of pluri-ethnic and pluri-lingual fragmented groups as 
well as shifting minorities and majorities.  
 
The conditions for the generation of legitimacy in deliberative democracy have 
been discussed in terms of epistemic rationality and political equality (Eriksen 
2005a; Fishkin and Luskin 2005; Habermas 1996; Peters 2005). With regard to 
the epistemic value of deliberation, it has been argued that understanding 
relies on basic cultural commonality (Kraus 2008; Kraus 2003; Taylor 1985; 
1989). Following this line of thinking, a democratic public sphere can only be 
built where a number of pre-political requisites are found. There is a 
communal and identitarian base that must pre-exist democracy. This is further 
linked to the idea that a common culture and identity are pivotal for 
deliberation because these create the trust and understanding that are necessary 
for citizens to reach sound agreement on political issues (Miller 1995). In an 
increasingly complex and culturally pluralistic Union of 27 Member States and 
23 official languages meaningful and equal deliberation can therefore be seen 
as an impossible project. The upshot of this is, then, in the final instance that 
democratisation in terms of engaging citizens and fostering a vibrant public 
sphere on the transnational level is an impossible task. If cultures demarcate 
different discursive universes, discourses between cultures must be seen as 
principally problematic (Leigh 2004). In the EU context, it therefore needs to be 
closer examined whether there is a correlation between deliberative quality, 
group homogeneity and language. Group heterogeneity and language 
pluralism would thus further exacerbate the potential threshold to 
deliberation between EU-citizens. This is in line with the literature according 
to which the democratic deficit of the EU is structurally rooted in the absence 
of a European demos. The people of Europe (or rather the many peoples in 
Europe) do not simply lack a common identity as citizens of the same polity. 
They also lack the socio-cultural prerequisites to become united, e.g. through a 
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common language, a shared cultural background or through participation in 
an encompassing public and media sphere (see e.g. Grimm 1995; Kraus 2008; 
Miller 1995; Offe and Preuss 2007; Offe 1998). Accordingly, deliberation has 
been mainly measured within and not across political cultures.3 In this line of 
reasoning, deliberation would work best, if political culture is contextualised, 
pluralism of opinions is contained, participants speak the same language, 
share a common ethical understanding and pay each other respect as co-
citizens (Habermas 1998; Wessler 2008). 
 
With regard to the political equality condition similar objections have been 
made in the literature with regard to the applicability of the principle to a 
transnational and pluri-lingual setting, Political equality in deliberation, it is 
claimed, is best served by the common origin and shared social and cultural 
traits of the participants. The demos of equal citizens relies on some pre-
political bonds: a common language, culture, and history (see e.g. Grimm 
1995; Schnapper 1994). Moreover, in terms of placing the citizen in relation to 
political authority, this relates to the argument that ‘citizenship’ belongs firmly 
to the lexical set of concepts like ‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘peoplehood’ (Williams 
1976). Consequently, the idea of reason and equality in communication is seen 
to be unrealistic in situations of deep diversity where deliberation cannot draw 
on a notion of a ‘demos of equals’ that unifies the citizens. This is allegedly the 
case in the European Union, which is characterised by unequal living 
conditions of its populations and which grants only a limited range of political 
rights to its citizens. The drawing of a statistical representative sample of 
participants from a heterogeneous population that lacks the basic bonds of 
trust and recognition would then interfere with the confinement of political 
equality. 
 
Against these valid objections with regard to the possibilities of applying the 
principles of deliberative democracy to a transnational and pluri-lingual 
setting, others have discussed solutions for reconciling political equality with 
deep diversity and the different meanings political equality assumes in 
multicultural societies (Fossum 2003; Fraser and Honneth 2004). This is in line 
with findings from social movement research, which show that contrary to the 
expectations, pluri-linguism at the European level does not impair the 
inclusivity and epistemic quality of deliberative settings such as the European 
Social Forum as compared to the exchange among movement activists at the 
national level (Doerr 2008; 2009). Finally, in a project on the reconfiguration of 
EU democracy, different polity options are discussed with regard to what 
                                                 
3  There are some useful insights on dynamic of discussions between heterogeneous groups in the 
literature on intergroup cooperation-contact (see Allport, 1954, Brewer and Miller, 1984, 1996). 
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political equality can mean and how it can be consistently applied with regard 
to the multiple demoi of Europe (Eriksen and Fossum 2007). 
  
If language pluralism needs to be defined as one of the basic EU values that 
should be conserved, protected and even promoted,4 the question of whether 
and how groups can interact and seek understanding across languages gains 
momentum. Translations can potentially help out in exceptional 
circumstances, for instance, in the case of professional groups or among 
experts. But can the epistemic condition of democracy be met in a pluri-lingual 
random sample of citizens setting? The critical issue here is how transformative 
the deliberative poll could be in a transnational setting. To what extent did the 
gathering of people together in Brussels over a weekend foster a sense of 
common understanding of the issues at stake? Further, when and under what 
conditions can this translate into recognition of EU authority and shared 
identity? EuroPolis offered a setting wherein one can consider this dimension 
of deliberation’s transformative role against the communitarian view that 
certain pre-political requisites must be in place for deliberative democracy to 
function effectively. 
 
Method and data: Europolis - the European Wide 
Deliberative Poll  
Taking place one week ahead of the 2009 European Parliamentary election, 
Europolis was set up to conduct a transnational deliberative experiment that 
engaged citizens from all EU Member States in debates on issues of shared 
concern. As such, Europolis was an experiment that can contribute to 
clarifying both the normative and the empirical concerns pertaining to the 
application of deliberative democratic theory’s core assumptions to the EU. 
While resting on the crucial normative standards of deliberative democratic 
theory, Europolis’ main innovation was to probe the conditions for 
deliberation among citizens in a transnational and multilingual setting 
through an empirical and comparative experiment.  
 
In other words, whereas the underlying constituency and the polity have thus 
far been treated as relatively stable variables in the designs of deliberative 
polling experiments, Europolis introduced an additional axis of variation 
along these lines. For that purpose, the views and preferences of the 348 
randomly selected EU citizens taking part in the Europolis Deliberative Poll 
                                                 
4 For that purpose, the first Barroso Commission even appointed a Commissioner of Multilinguism. 
The    language strategy of the EU with the aims to promote language pluralism internally and 
externally has been established in 2008. 
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have been assessed against a representative sample of the EU population 
which was used as a control group.  
 
The Europolis project followed standard Deliberative Poll design, which is 
organised as follows: First, a cross-sectional random survey is organised and 
administered to a representative sample of the universe under study. Second, 
a random sub-sample of those citizens first targeted to answer to the cross-
sectional survey is invited to attend a deliberation event. Often, to minimise 
barriers to participation, citizens are paid a stipend for their time. Third, those 
who say they will come to the event are sent balanced background materials to 
inform them about the issues to be discussed and to incite them to put more 
attention and think harder on these topics. Fourth, the participants come 
together for some days, and are randomly assigned to moderated small 
groups to discuss the issues. As part of their small group discussions, they 
develop questions to ask a balanced panel of experts and politicians on each 
issue. Fifth, at the end of the event they fill out a questionnaire. Sixth, the 
citizens' changes of opinion from before and after their deliberation are 
analysed. These results are shared with the larger public and with opinion-
leaders and policy-makers. Seventh, highlights of the deliberation process are 
televised to communicate to the larger polity the results. This guarantees 
accountability and also seeks to raise public interest in politics and levels of 
political participation.  
 
The cross-national citizen dialogue of Europolis specifically addressed climate 
change and immigration, two high-profile issues of recent political debates in 
Europe. The participants were assigned into 25 small groups consisting of two 
or three languages. Discussions were led by moderators who had the task to 
manage the workings of the group through minimal interventions. In 
addition, there was a host of translators involved with each group due to their 
pluri-lingual character, thus allowing verbal exchange in the participants’ 
mother tongue.  
 
The Europolis Deliberative Poll produced two sets of data. First, the 
questionnaires allow us to measure both, pre- and post-deliberation opinions 
and knowledge level and the perceptions of the participants at the end of 
experiment. Secondly, audio recordings of the small group discussions have 
been coded by using a modified version of the Discourse Quality Index (DQI). 
DQI is a measurement instrument5 that relies on qualitative coding of debates 
                                                 
5  The unit of analysis of the DQI is a speech act delivered by a participant. The entire discussion is 
broken   down into smaller speech units and each speech act is coded separately. Every speech act is 
coded for all the variables included in the coding scheme. Coding with DQI is not an automatic 
exercise and it requires qualitative interpretation of the coder which need to be familiar with the 
coding scheme and theoretical concepts that the measurement instrument is constructed upon.. 
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based on a carefully constructed coding scheme.6 The initial DQI that was 
constructed to analyse elite deliberation in parliamentary assemblies (Steiner 
et al. 2004) was modified to account for the specifics of citizens’ deliberations 
and to measure effects of transnationalism and pluri-lingualism. We coded 
and analysed small group discussions on immigration control in groups of the 
following language composition: Italian and English speakers (group SG7); 
English speakers and Bulgarians (group SG8); English, French (group SG11); 
Italians, Spaniards and Swedes (SG12). The indicators and measures we use 
for the empirical part of our paper are listed and described below. 
 
In order to test possible effects of deliberative polling on the recognition of the 
polity and identification of the constituency of democratic politics we raise the 
following research questions which correspond with two challenges for how 
to conceive deliberative democracy in the context of the EU.  
 
1) The Polity dimension 
a. Can deliberation in the EU work within a group of ordinary, 
randomly selected citizens instead of stakeholders and experts 
and can it support collective problem-solving? 
b. How can deliberative democracy in the EU be conceived under 
conditions of shared sovereignty and contested levels of political 
authority? 
 
2) The Constituency dimension 
a. Can deliberation work within a heterogeneous group of 
participants, who were socialised in different national cultures 
and do not share the same language? 
b.  How can deliberative democracy be conceived under conditions 
of enhanced group heterogeneity and applied to a group of 
participants, which do not recognise each other as co-citizens, i.e. 
as members of the same political community 
 
These questions are addressed by a mix of quantitative and qualitative data 
sets and operationalized within the polity and constituency dimensions by 
relating them to the following hypotheses: 
 
Polity hypothesis 1 (questionnaire): As an indicator of recognition of the EU 
polity, we expect that the level of political authority chosen by participants as 
relevant for  problem solving within the two issue fields would shift towards 
the EU level after participating in Europolis. This would correlate with 
constituency hypothesis 1 measured in a higher identification as European at 
                                                 
6  See annex for the coding scheme. 
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the end of experiment while identification of participants with their own 
country remains constant or goes down.  
  
Polity hypothesis 2 (DQI) As an indicator of recognition of the EU polity, we 
expect that participants justify their arguments less in terms of particular 
group interests or references to their country of origin but by referring to the 
benefits of EU/Europe, or to common good principles. We further expect that 
‘European justifications’ as an effect of group discussion increase while 
particularistic (nationalist) justifications decrease over time.7 
 
Constituency hypothesis 1 (questionnaire): As an indicator of recognition of 
political community, we expect that participants identify more strongly as 
Europeans after participating in Europolis. At the same time, we would expect 
socialising and learning effects from participation in group discussions 
measured through the self-perception of the participants (post-event 
evaluation). This would correlate with the readiness to support the allocation 
of political authority to the EU as measured in the polity hypothesis 1. 
 
Constituency hypothesis 2 (DQI): As an indicator of recognition of political 
community, we expect that participants participate equally in group 
discussions and that no linguistic group dominates over others. Furthermore, 
we look at the role of the facilitator, in order to determine to what degree 
equal participation has been encouraged and if that was the case, who needed 
encouragement. We further measure degrees of interactivity between 
participants across languages and whether these interactions include positive, 
neutral or negative reference to other participants’ arguments.  
 
Analysis: Deliberative citizens in action 
Introducing variance in both the polity and constituency dimension, Europolis 
measures not only change of opinion and knowledge of the participants with 
regard to the policy issues at stake but also impact on deliberation on the 
recognition of political authority and composition of political community. In 
the following, we will address each of these two dimensions separately. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7   The ’content of justification’ variable originally captures whether arguments are made in terms of 
narrow group interests, in terms of the common good, or in terms of both (Steiner et al. 2004: 58). 
In our modified coding scheme we added the category Europe justified speech acts” to capture the 
specifica of Europolis citizens’ deliberation in the context of EP elections. 
Irena Fiket, Espen D. H. Olsen, Hans-Jörg Trenz 
10 ARENA Working Paper 09/2011
 
The polity dimension  
Following the traditional design of deliberative polling experiments, the 
Europolis questionnaire measured changes of opinion and preference of 
citizens who deliberate on important policy issues. In addition, participants 
were specifically asked to reflect on the appropriate level of decision-making. 
At which level should political authority be allocated: entirely at the EU level, 
shared by both levels in a ‘multi-level’ arrangement or entirely at the national 
level? 
 
Table 1. Preferred level of decision-making 
And on a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means 
‘entirely at the EU level’, '10' means ‘entirely by 
the individual Member States’, and '5' is 
‘exactly in the middle’, at what level do you 
think decisions should be made in each of the 
following areas?   
Mean T1 Mean T3 Difference  T3-T1 N 
Immigration 5,05 5,07 0,02 323
Climate Change 3,39 3,13 -0,26 322
Fighting unemployment 6,06 5,99 -0,07 321
Fighting crime 5,49 5,73 0,24 322
** significant level 0,001 
 
Table 1 reports the questionnaire results of aggregate change in participants’ 
views on decision-making levels before (T1) and after deliberation (T2) with 
regard to the two debated issues (immigration and climate change) and two 
‘control’ issues (unemployment and crime).8 Europolis participants become 
more favourable of shifting decision-making powers to the supranational level 
on climate change and unemployment issues but less favourable on 
immigration and crime. Looking more closely at the issues discussed, climate 
change is the proverbial transnational and boundary-crossing issue, while 
immigration is often linked to identity discourses in nation-states. The 
differences between the climate change and immigration issues on this score 
could indicate that citizens, despite balanced information and being 
confronted with a diversity of opinions remained rather ‘conservative’ on this 
aspect of the polity dimension. In an issue that is already ‘globally confined’ 
they became more inclined towards solutions ‘beyond the nation-state’, while 
on a typical national identity issue they remained ‘national’ in their outlook. 
The control issues support this interpretation with regard to the fight of 
                                                 
8   Before-after changes for the participants were obtained by comparing the mean value at time of 
recruitment (T1) and time 3 (T3), the end of deliberative event. We assessed the difference using a 
paired comparison test of significance for all questions we include in our analyses. 
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unemployment (transnational social rights dimension) and policing (internal 
security as a national prerogative). 
 
The qualitative analysis of small groups’ discussions gives a more nuanced 
picture of salient cleavages among European citizens about the question of 
allocating political authority for immigration control. On the one hand, 
citizens reflect national legacies and express preferences in accordance to the 
membership status of their country (e.g. being a strong member state and not 
part of the Schengen group):  
 
I’d say, that for some countries, it will be very difficult to implement this 
zero immigration policy because of the colonial past. In the UK there are 
just a great […] People who fought for the UK during previous wars will 
be allowed to residence in the UK. So it will be very difficult for the UK 
to agree to a zero immigration regulation coming from the EU.’ (UK 
male, SG 22). 
 
On the other hand, there can be also very pragmatic reasons for citizens to 
prefer nation states prerogatives in immigration control or to opt for a 
delegation of competences. Some participants recognize that EU competences 
would be most desirable to achieve policy goals but deplore deficits in 
implementation or inefficiency of existing institutional arrangement and 
therefore opt for national authority as an ‘interim solution’: 
 
The message they send to us (experts who participate at the plenary 
sessions) is that for Europe made of twenty-seven member states is 
difficult to find an agreement with regard to the legislation on 
immigration. It seems that the countries do not want to use this common 
law […] and this just shows the complexity of the issue. And now I have 
to say that I understand better why mechanism proceeds so slowly, and 
because it is so difficult to agree […] to reach a decision at European 
level […] where the various states are independent, therefore the 
European Union is not really supranational […].(Swedish national, 
female, SG 12) 
  
Finally, from the geo-political perspective of Southern Europe, a primary 
interest on EU support for building control capacities prevails: 
 
But what I understood today at the plenary meeting was that everybody 
blames individual member states. Italy is sending back immigrants. 
Spain does not want to do anything. Greece the same. Still, Italy, Spain 
and Greece are receiving these people, trying to select them in the best 
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possible way. I would ask the ‘lords’ of the European Union what they 
are doing for these countries. (Italian male, SG 12) 
 
Qualitative coding of group discussions further helps us to understand how 
citizens justify the appropriateness of collective choices and levels of decision-
making. The underlying assumption is that citizens by expressing political 
preferences with regard to specific policy solutions also raise validity claims 
with regard to the common good that applies with regard to the debated issue. 
In particular, we are interested here in the scope of validity of the particular 
arguments delivered by citizens. Within what particular institutional 
arrangements are arguments held to be valid and who should be the main 
beneficiary of a given policy solution and to whom shall collective decisions 
apply? In a given setting, should the collective choice respond to the needs of 
the local community, a sub-state region, a nation-state community, the 
community of citizens in the European Union, or the global community of all 
human beings?  
 
Table 2.  Justification9  
all groups(7,8,11,12) I Discussion 
II Formulation of 
questions 
III Discussion-after 
plenary 
 N speech acts 
(excluded moderator) 202 74 73
 N of speech acts 
justified  
among which: 109 40 25
Group interests, own 
country 25.9% 25.5% 12.5%
Europe 31.5% 19.3% 45.8%
Global or common good  
references  42.5% 55.2% 41.7%
 
Our data supplement the questionnaire finding that citizens are not only 
generally favourable towards supranational decision-making but do in fact 
also engage with the issue of the EU polity and express strong opinions on 
European integration in relation to alternative local, national or global polity 
settings. Citizens thus accept or take for granted that the handling of complex 
policy issues requires some practical arrangement of shared sovereignty in a 
multi-level polity arrangement. On the whole, Table 2 indicates that European 
and common good orientations with regard to the issue of immigration control 
prevail over national interests. Citizens demonstrate a clear tendency to look 
                                                 
9    We report the percentages of cases which had level of justification higher than zero. Thus, 
only justified speech acts were included in the analyses. 
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beyond the national context to validate their claims and to raise competing 
polity preferences. They had, in a sense, internalised the fact of free movement 
and residence rights inside the EU. The common good of Europeans was for 
instance linked to issues such as the economic future of Europe and avoidance 
of illegal immigrants dwelling on EU territory. The thus constructed European 
common good was, then, used as a justificatory argument for supranational 
policies on and control of physical entry to the EU: 
 
The only thing I want to say is that we can’t really allow to sit on the 
fence. If we truly want to build a true Europe, we should talk about 
external borders only, and the EU member states should relinquish 
some of their sovereignty. I think that there’s no other way to go about 
it. (French male, SG 11) 
 
So, I think we should also strengthen the borders of Europe, because if 
we make all these people legal, we will have a massive arrival of 
migrants, and we do not have the capacity to welcome all these people. 
And it will only be to the detriment of the migrants themselves. 
(Luxembourg/Portuguese male, SG 11) 
 
In further analysing the debates, we adopted a sequencing approach in order 
to separate different phases of small group discussion on immigration issue 
(see table 2). The first phase of discussion evolved mainly around the 
identification of the problems at stake. The second phase was more strongly 
influenced by the moderators, who coordinated the more formalised task to 
formulate questions for the plenary session. These questions were based on a 
selection of previously justified contributions to the debate, which made a 
further engagement of the participants in justificatory discourse during this 
phase redundant. The third phase was again more open and participants had 
the possibility to express their views on the plenary session with experts and 
come up with some concluding thoughts on the issue. Leaving aside the more 
formalised setting of the second phase, we would expect that citizens’ 
deliberations in the context of EP elections enhance a European common good 
orientation among the participants. Table 2 largely confirms this hypothesis. 
As an effect of knowledge increase, learning and socialisation during the 
experiment participants become more ‘European’ in their justifications and 
develop a sense of belonging to the EU polity. At the end of the experiment 
one third of the justifications delivered contained a European common good 
reference, while references to national interest clearly diminished. This finding 
is coherent with deliberative theory assumptions of the transformative power 
of deliberation that can alter individual preferences towards the identification 
of a common good (Mansbridge 2010). In addressing and recognising the EU 
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as a polity, where borders and the insider/outsider logic matters, these 
debates also suggest an evolving sense of community between the 
participants. Were they more than just private participants in a confined 
deliberative experiment? In the next section, we address this so-called 
constituency dimension of deliberation between lay citizens in the 
transnational setting of the EU. 
 
The constituency dimension 
The pluri-lingual and transnational design of the Europolis experiment raised 
the question of whether citizens are able to interact and debate across 
languages and cultures, thereby turning a heterogeneous group of randomly 
chosen participants into a constituency of European democracy. Any viable 
polity depends on a modicum of identification from its citizens. As 
highlighted ad infinitum, the EU lacks the typical identity signifiers that are 
held to be constitutive of nation-states (Calhoun 2001; Castiglione 2009; 
Delanty 2005; Giesen 2003). Since a strong political identity that would replace 
the existing identities of the nation state seems unattainable and for many also 
undesirable, the question is whether the European setting is based on a zero-
sum relationship between existing national identities or conducive to a 
positive sum relationship of nested identities (Góra et al. 2011).  For the one, it 
is only on the basis of nationness that the citizens can build trust and solidarity 
that is necessary to participate in opinion-forming processes. The lack of a 
basis of political community would therefore restrict the scope of integration 
to intergovernmental cooperation. Participants in transnational mini-publics 
would be expected to defend primarily national views and interests. In such a 
view, the group discussions would lead to a nationalist clash among the 
participants who would become more introverted in defending the integrity of 
the national community and mapping their attitudes onto a cultural cleavage 
towards their follow participants from other member states. Alternatively, 
European integration is seen as giving expression to a cosmopolitan vocation 
that can be transposed to the universal and inclusive community of democracy 
(Beck and Grande 2007; Delanty 2009; Eriksen 2007). The EU-setting would 
thus be post-national, in the sense of renouncing on a strong identity, and the 
persisting plural identities would be significantly constrained by the necessity 
to respect diversity and cosmopolitan values (Gora et al. 2011). Under these 
conditions, participation in group discussions would stimulate citizens to 
engage with others’ views and interests. This would lead, in turn, not only to 
attitude change but also trigger off micro processes of identity change and 
socialisation of participants as citizens of Europe.   
 
Europolis provided an ample ‘laboratory’ for gauging the degree to which 
group heterogeneity and language differences can be overcome in deliberative 
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mini-publics. Each of the 25 discussion groups was composed by 12-15 
participants from two or more language groups and sometimes three or four 
countries. Did participants in such a multinational and pluri-lingual setting 
have equal opportunity to participate in the debate and to contribute to 
deliberative exchange and opinion formation? (Steiner et al. 2004: 56). In the 
following analysis, we use a mix of quantitative questionnaire and qualitative 
DQI variables to test possible effects of ethno-cultural heterogeneity and 
language pluralism on deliberative quality and test out the possibilities for 
socialisation, group reflexivity and identity formation. 
 
Effects of ethno-cultural heterogeneity 
First, with regard to ethno-cultural plurality, our data show that exclusive 
national identities did not affect the quality of group discussions and the 
potential to arrive at common understanding among the participants. The 
danger of a clash of national identities can be ruled out. In addition, 
deliberation in a transnational setting shows a clear potential to spur identity 
change among the participants. More concretely, the share of participants that 
perceived themselves as national citizens only decreased significantly after 
participation in the deliberative poll. Participants turned from identifying in 
exclusive nationalist terms to becoming ‘inclusive nationalists’, i.e. also 
identified as members of a community of Europeans (Risse 2010: 13). 
 
Table 3. Identity 
 Mean T1 Mean T3 Difference  T3-T1 N
On a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' 
is ‘not at all’, '10' is ‘completely’, 
and '5' is ‘exactly in the middle’, 
how much would you say you 
think of yourself as being 
European? 
7,10 7,39
 
 
 
* 
 
 
0,29 328
And on the same 0 to 10 scale, 
how much would you say you 
think of yourself as just being 
from your [COUNTRY]? Only 
country= 10 
7,74 6,67 *** -1,07 326
And if you had to choose just one 
of the following alternatives, what 
would you say you see yourself 
as…? 1-nationality only/ 4-
European 
2,18 2,23 0,06 323
** significant level 0,001 
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Table 3 indicates that, although there are no dramatic identity changes,10 
reasoned debate and opinion exchange in small group discussions enables 
citizens to relate to the broader gamut of identities that emerge in a pluri-
ethnic, multilingual, and multilevel polity like the EU. Even though the topics 
brought to discussion were geared towards more pragmatic issues of problem-
solving, most participants were sensitive to questions of group belonging and 
sometimes also more vocal and explicit on identity issues. Qualitative data 
from transcripts give numerous examples of the development of reflexive 
capacities of participants turning group deliberations into critical voice of the 
citizens. Critical reflexivity is partly encouraged by the specific task the group 
had to perform in formulating expert question and addressing policy makers. 
The confrontation with experts and other groups in the plenaries created 
shared expectations that were exchanged among the participants especially in 
the last round of the debate.  
 
The development of critical and reflexive attitudes as part of group 
deliberation can be considered as an important identity marker. We can 
distinguish between different layers of reflexive deliberations which can 
encompass a critical reflection on the role of participants as citizens, a critical 
reflection on the purpose of the scientific experiment and their role therein, 
and finally, a meta-discourse on Europe and its complex identity questions. 
For obvious reasons, critical reflexivity as part of the group discussions is 
unequally developed; in some instances, it is given only sporadic expression 
and restricted to single statements, in other instances, it unfolds in longer 
sequences through dialogue among the participants. 
 
First, group solidarity is enhanced by the processes of becoming reflexive as 
citizens of Europe and expressing critique towards the experts and politicians. 
In the following statement, an Italian participant confronts the unitary visions 
of the citizens (the participants of the panel) with the still divided positions of 
the political representatives (the experts of the plenary). We (the citizens) can 
make proposals and provide solutions for problems, which we feel are ours. We 
can, in principle, convert from nationals to Europeans. But they (the 
politicians) are not able to give substance to a European identity. They do not 
know how to use the opportunities (like a citizen forum) for us but only for 
them. They do not take up our ideas but only follow their opportunistic 
interests: 
                                                 
10   Differences in identification between T1 and T3 are not particularly strong and only two out of 
three indicators are statistically significant. 
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[we should] [...] make a question to our political representatives of 
Europe: Whether (and when) Europe will give substance to a European 
identity. [...] We could give the proposals and solutions to our problems 
(but) we must feel them as our problems, we should feel as Europeans 
[…] the fact that we still (mainly) have a national identity is limiting 
strongly our ability and participation. In fact, the participation in 
European elections was shameful. The sense of belonging (to Europe) is 
lacking. (Italian male, SG 7) 
 
More specifically, the experts and politicians are criticised for their 
unwillingness to provide concrete answers or their incapacity to make 
themselves understandable to the citizens. This lack of responsiveness is then 
generalised as a European experience that marks the citizen-elite divide of the 
European Union and justifies the democratic response of indignant citizens 
against the elites in Brussels: 
 
What I experienced as a person, I felt that these young women (experts 
and politicians who participate at the plenary sessions) [...] I do not 
know what kind of degree they have, I assume that they should at least 
have a good degree in international politics given the fact that they 
arrived here [...] and even if they wanted to give us the answers, those 
were not the answers in my opinion. [...] It is absolutely unacceptable 
that they didn’t find the way to answer to such a precise question. It is 
unacceptable. And I am sorry for this but I if I could decide who should 
occupy those places at the European Union I would suggest to place us 
there. Why so many people are moved from their homes (to work for 
the EU) if they can’t give us concrete answers? (Italian female, SG 12) 
 
This indignation about the incomprehensible experts and elites is also shared 
by other participants. In the following statement, the upcoming elections are 
seen as an opportunity to mark a difference. Again, a ‘we’-feeling is created by 
distinguishing participants of the experiment as the forerunners of a European 
citizenry who should guarantee that only the ‘really qualified’ are elected. 
 
[...] now we have the European elections, and we should all do the 
‘advertising’ in order to select the qualified people. So they will not 
come there only to be ‘chair warmer’. (Italian male, SG 12) 
 
Secondly, group solidarity is enhanced by the processes of becoming 
‘reflexive’ of being part of a European experiment. Reflections on the purpose 
of the experiment are a recurrent topic of group discussions. Participants see 
themselves confronted with the expectation that they should develop a 
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common understanding and we-feeling as Europeans. In general, this 
possibility is not rejected but taken up as an opportunity for further reflection: 
 
 […] the purpose of this research is to understand how the discussions 
may change our views [...] and I think that the possibility to 
communicate with each other could help us to understand each other 
better and could lead us to feel more European [...] because we get to 
know other people and we discuss with them [...] so the time we spent 
here is good for us. (UK female, SG 07) 
 
Another Italian participant reflects about the privileged experience to 
participate in the scientific experience, which for him is also a ‘human 
experience’. He is however fully aware of the isolated character of the 
experience and deplores the lost opportunity for the EU to not making a more 
systematic use of the ideas and proposals that are produced by the citizens: 
 
I wonder why this opportunity is not used by the EU. It could have been 
an opportunity for the EU and for the people to bring up new ideas. In 
fact, it could have given the space for (our) new ideas that could have 
become active and not only passive proposals (like now). Instead, it’s 
only good for us as an experience, but in the end it only remains a 
‘discourse’ that we carry with us, but this benefit does not sufficiently 
justify that the EU is losing this opportunity. (Italian male, SG 07) 
 
Participants thus combine their critical reflection about the experiment with 
the expression of critique of the European Union and the state of European 
democracy. As a case of second-order reflexivity, this transformation of 
becoming a European citizen can again become an element of reflexive group 
deliberation. It is then recognised that the experiment was not helpful in an 
instrumental sense to arrive at better policies and solutions but rather in a 
symbolic sense to make participants aware of the dimensions of European 
citizenship: 
 
[…] this meeting, at least in my opinion, did not help us to solve or to 
clarify the problems of immigration. But, it increased the awareness of 
European citizenship. Not because they made me feel more European, 
but because they made me be more careful towards the people we are 
selecting to represent us in Europe. (Italian female, SG 12) 
 
Last but not least, we can identify instances of a meta-discourse on Europe. 
One Swedish participant, for instance, calls upon her group fellows to reflect 
directly upon the notion of ‘our European life’ and ‘European life style’, a 
Deliberation under conditions of language pluralism 
ARENA Working Paper 09/2011 19  
 
rather unclear notion for her that is in need of common interpretation:   
 
I do not know what ‘the European way of life’ exactly means, so I 
would like to ask you how to interpret this expression. (Do) we have a 
European way of life, if there is such diversity even if I don’t really 
know what could be defined as a Swedish culture or anything else. For 
this reason I am curious to know what do you think of the expression 
‘the European way of life’. (Swedish female, SG 12) 
 
While acknowledging the potential for transnational identity formation, 
another participant also underlined its possible pitfalls and limits. A contrast 
to this is found in the interplay between different modes of identity that might 
change over time:  
 
For me, Europe and the world are a village […] A Frenchman for 
example, coming from the south of France to the north of France, is like 
in a foreign country. And with the years, he will become used to the 
people of Northern France and the people of Northern France will 
become used to him. […]. And I think that those who welcome the 
migrants should create situations where people can better integrate 
themselves. I think if you do that, you’re not going to lose your 
identity; you’re not going to lose your origins […] 
(Luxembourg/Portuguese male, SG 11) 
 
These findings on critical reflexivity of intercultural group discussions 
strongly back an understanding of reflexive public deliberation as an effective 
means to overcome cultural incommensurability (Bohman 2003). Socialisation 
factors of taking part in an assembly like a deliberative poll matter to explain 
the transformative force of deliberation in intercultural settings. The 
challenges of cultural pluralism are thus minimised by the effects of group 
reflexivity. Participants from diverse ethno-political groups are committed to 
shared practices for providing evidence and discussing solutions to common 
problems. What is more, participants from diverse socio-cultural backgrounds 
are critically engaged in contesting political authority and defining their role 
as European citizens (not least in light of the upcoming European Parliament 
elections). 
 
These findings on group reflexivity and socialisation as a counter-effect to 
cultural pluralism are also strongly backed by the questionnaire post-
deliberation poll. The views and perceptions of participants on the behaviour 
of other participants, provides answers to the degree of cohesion and ‘group-
ness’ in the transnational mini-public of Europolis. Our data show that 
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contrary to the communitarian assumption, language pluralism and group 
heterogeneity were not seen by participants as impediments to dialogue in 
small group discussions (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Group heterogeneity and deliberative setting 
Most participants seemed to mainly care  about their own country and 
not about the European Union  %
Disagree (0-4 on 0-10 scale)  39,1
Exactly in the middle (5)  29,6
Agree (6-10 on 0-10 scale)  27,6
Don’t know/no answer  3,7
On a 0 to 10 scale, where '0' means ‘completely disagree’, '10' means 
‘completely agree’, and '5' is ‘exactly in the middle’, how strongly would you 
agree or disagree with each of the following statements is?   %
The members of my small group participated equally in the discussion   
Disagree (0-4 on 0-10 scale)  23,9
Exactly in the middle (5)  12,4
Agree (6-10 on 0-10 scale)  62,1
Don’t know/no answer  1,7
I learned a lot about people different from me – about who they are and 
how they live   
Disagree (0-4 on 0-10 scale)  5,7
Exactly in the middle (5)   10,9
Agree (6-10 on 0-10 scale) 81,3
Don’t know/no answer  2,0
My fellow participants respected what I had to say, even when they 
didn’t agree  
Disagree (0-4 on 0-10 scale)  3.4
Exactly in the middle (5)  7.8
Agree (6-10 on 0-10 scale)  84.2
Don’t know/no answer  4.6
Despite simultaneous translations I had problems to follow the debate 
as if it were in my own language   
Disagree (0-4 on 0-10 scale)  80,5
Exactly in the middle (5)  4,0
Agree (6-10 on 0-10 scale)  12,1
Don’t know/no answer  3,4
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Overall, the participants evaluated their experience of participating in the 
deliberative event as highly positive. Only 27,6% of participants felt that their 
group fellows mainly cared about their own country and not about European 
Union. 62 % agreed that participation was equal in small group discussions. 
The experience of meeting and talking with other people from all across the 
continent and with different cultural background also had an impact: 81% of 
the participants thought that they had learnt a lot about people different from 
themselves, ‘about who they are and how they live’. 84% felt that their fellow 
participants respected what they had to say, even if they did not necessarily 
agree. On average, the participants thought the event extremely balanced and 
considered the quality of the group discussions they took part in to be high. 
Most importantly, participants from other member states were not seen as 
hostile players who defended diverging interests but as equals who expressed 
strong view and provided accessible justifications. On this score, then, we can 
conclude that, overall, the results of Europolis show that contrary to the 
communitarian assumptions, ethno-cultural plurality has no significant impact 
on deliberative quality and the possibility for citizens from different member 
states to debate and find agreement on issues of common concern.  
 
Effects of language pluralism 
For the purpose of this analysis, language is used as the second analytically 
distinct though not independent variable in constituting political community 
and democratic constituencies. As we saw from table 4, participants had, 
according to their self-evaluation, no problems in ‘understanding’ their fellow 
European citizens. Moreover, language was seen by only 12% as a barrier to 
follow the debate. When analysing data from the actual group deliberations 
the results are more mixed. Table 5 summarizes the findings of language 
group participation and interactions in different sequences of deliberation in 
the four groups analysed. 
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Table 5. Equality, language groups and the role of moderators11 
  
I Discussion 
II Formulation 
of questions 
III 
Discussion-
after plenary
SG 12 
(N participants 
15) 
Language of 
moderator - 
Italian 
Total speech acts 
(excluded moderator) 76 9 16
Moderator intervene to 
engage individual 
participants 2,6 % 0,0 % 0,0 %
Moderator intervene to 
engage linguistic group 
(sw) 3,9 % 0,0 % 0,0 %
Neutral or positive 
reference to other 
arguments 35,5 % 11,1 % 43,8 %
Swedish  n. of speech acts 23,3 % 23,5 % 37,5 %
Italian  n. of speech acts 65,1 % 70,6 % 62,5 %
Spanish  n. of speech acts 11,6 % 5,9% 0,0 %
 Total 100 % 100 % 100% 
SG 11  
(N participants 
13) 
Language of 
moderator –
English  
 
 
 
Total speech acts 
(excluded moderator) 
46 9 16
Moderator intervene to 
engage individual 
participants 
20,7% 22,2 9,1
Moderator intervene to 
engage linguistic group  
0,0% 0,0% 0,0%
Neutral or positive 
reference to other 
arguments 
50.0% 42,2% 66,7
FR  LUX %  of speech 
acts 
30,8% 15,6% 25,8%
UK IRL %  of speech acts 69,2% 84,4% 74,2%
Total 100% 100% 100%
                                                 
11  The percentages of each linguistic group speech acts are calculated by weight of each 
language within the composition of small group. 
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SG 8  
(N participants 
10) 
Language of 
moderator –
English 
Total speech acts 
(excluded moderator) 
64 35 20
Moderator intervene to 
engage individual 
participants 
11,0% 8,6% 30,0%
Moderator intervene to 
engage linguistic group  
0,0 % 0,0 % 0,0 %
Neutral or positive 
reference to other 
arguments 
39,1% 34,3% 50,0 %
UK 67,2% 44,2% 50,0 %
Bulgarian n. of speech 
acts 
32,8 % 55,8% 50,0 %
Total  100% 100% 100%
SG 7 
(N participants 
11) 
Language of 
moderator – 
Italian 
Total speech acts 
(excluded moderator) 
46 21 21
Toderator intervene to 
engage individual 
participants 
15,2 % 4,5 % 5,0 %
Moderator intervene to 
engage linguistic group 
(engl) 
0,0 % 0,0 % 10,0 %
Neutral or positive 
reference to other 
arguments 
50,0 % 90,9 % 85,0 %
UK and IRL  56,9 % 50 % 68,1 %
Italian  n. of speech acts 43,1 % 50,0 % 31,9 %
Total 100% 100% 100%
     
In our qualitative analysis of group discussions we approached the criterion of 
equal participation by weighting each linguistic group’s share in deliberation. 
Table 5 indicates that all linguistic groups participated in group discussions. 
Furthermore, moderators rarely intervened to engage specific linguistic 
groups in discussion but barely encouraged individual participants to get on 
board in the debates.  There are, however, clear patterns of language 
dominance in two groups (11 and 12) that correlate with the language spoken 
by the moderator while in the other two groups (8 and 7) moderating effects 
on language dominance did not become salient. Our data set is too small to 
further enquire this question of language dominance. Possible intervening 
variables that explain the variation on the share of group participation are the 
design of the group setting, delays in waiting for translations and individual 
styles of moderation.  
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Another possible explanation for the minimisation of language as an impact 
on deliberative quality is that pluri-lingual settings are in fact especially 
conducive towards certain ‘habits of listening’ (Doerr 2008; 2009). 
Transnational groups might turn out to be more attentive listeners and 
overcome habits of hearing in familiar national settings. In a discussion among 
co-nationals we know intuitively whom to listen to and whom to ignore. In 
transnational setting, this familiarity is not given. In Europolis this was 
amplified by technical equipment (simultaneous translations, headphones and 
microphones) which helped focus the attention of the participants. As we see 
from the quote above, participants were routinely asked to speak slowly and 
keep their speech intelligible in order to facilitate translation and thus mutual 
understanding. The higher listening requirements of the pluri-lingual setting 
might thus have worked positively for the deliberative quality.  
 
Overall, then, our results with regard to the equality of participation and 
status of language groups confirm the overall trend of the Europolis 
experiment that plurality is not a principled barrier to deliberation. 
Participants did not isolate themselves but engaged in debate with citizens 
from other language groups. Language dominance, to the extent it occurred in 
particular sequences of the experiment can be explained as an effect of several 
intervening variables, which cannot be fully controlled by our research design. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has highlighted that the polity and constituency challenges do not 
stand in the way for conceiving deliberation in a transnational and pluri-
lingual setting. Contrary to the ‘no demos thesis’, the Europolis experiment 
proves that citizens are in principle able to interact and debate across 
languages and cultures, thereby turning a heterogeneous group of randomly 
chosen participants into a nascent constituency of democracy. We therefore 
conclude that communicative barriers as deriving from dispersed authority 
and group heterogeneity in the post-national constellation are for the most 
part practical and not substantial. They can be overcome by careful design of 
the deliberative setting which facilitates encounters among the participants 
and generates habits of respect, listening and learning. 
  
More specifically, our overall findings from both sets of data firstly indicate 
that the EU polity is in fact recognised and taken as a reference point by 
citizens for exercising communicative power and impact on decision-making. 
Secondly, Europolis has provided a microcosmic European ‘public’, where 
citizens from highly diverse backgrounds and despite language pluralism 
have debated and contested each other on issues of principle and policy 
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related to European integration. Problems of understanding related to the use 
of plural languages in heterogeneous group settings can thus be partly 
overcome, though there remain restrictions in how the principle of political 
equality can be approached and how the overall representativeness of the 
experiment can be defended (Olsen and Trenz 2011). 
 
The engaging of ordinary citizens through deliberative experiments should 
however not be misunderstood as a tool to fabricate citizens’ support and to 
return from contentious politics to a more consensual style of EU policy 
making. Deliberation among lay citizens can as well express to public 
discontent with EU policies and institutions and exacerbate the citizens-elite 
divide that is underlying EU policy-making. By giving citizens the 
opportunity to discuss and voice opinion, deliberative polling raises 
awareness of the complexities of political decision-making and democratic 
legitimacy. In this light, deliberative polling highlights that legitimacy does 
not necessarily have to rest on substantive consensus on institutional issues or 
policy, but rather is ultimately dependent on the public ‘saturation’ of political 
will-formation through open and unfiltered debate. EU politics are 
increasingly politicised and EuroPolis brings with it evidence that the 
opportunity to engage in debates is a more effective means to mobilise 
political participation than endless media campaigns and public relations 
exercises courtesy of EU institutions that address the passive, and, for the most 
part, non-attentive citizens. 
 
Deliberative polls are technical designs forgiving lay citizens the possibility to 
become more informed and to debate issues of political importance but not 
magical tools for resolving the democratic and legitimacy deficits associated 
with particular political settings. In this sense, the project of deliberative 
polling has come some way in opening up new avenues for political 
participation and active citizenship, but it has yet to provide a platform for 
‘unprocessed’ deliberation between citizens, devoid of technical, cultural, or 
linguistic limitations. This indicates that there are still unexplored effects of the 
specific setting of deliberative experiments like Europolis. The relatively high 
hopes pinned to deliberative polling as an instrument for democratic reform of 
the EU need to be put into perspective in light of the unsettled questions of 
political representation and public mediation in a transnational setting such as 
the EU (Olsen and Trenz 2011). Given the experimental character of Europolis, 
it is therefore premature to draw any conclusion from the ‘microcosm of 
European citizens’ to the contours of a European public sphere. Deliberative 
polling opens a forum for the expression of public voice and discontent, which 
operates under scientifically controlled conditions, but does not automatically 
generate democratic legitimacy for the EU. The latter remains ultimately 
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bounded by the restricted capacities for the channelling of public discontent 
and the limited institutional responsiveness in a diversified polity such as the 
EU.  
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